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ABSTRACT
During the October 2006 Term, the United States Supreme Court will
consider the constitutionality of voluntary race-conscious student assignment
plans as employed in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No.1 and Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education. These cases
will mark the Court’s first inquiry regarding the use of race to combat de facto
segregation in public education. This article examines the constitutionality of
such plans and provides a prediction regarding the Court’s decisions.
The article begins with an analysis of the resegregation trend currently
plaguing American educational institutions and identifies two causes for the
occurrence: (1) the shift in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding
desegregation and (2) school officials’ adherence to the “neighborhood school
concept” when making student assignment decisions. The article then examines
the challenged plans, specifically their attempts to create and maintain racially
diverse student bodies through the use of racial tiebreakers and guidelines. After
considering the Supreme Court’s prior decisions and rationale regarding the use
of race in education, the article predicts that the Supreme Court will strike down
both plans as violative of the Equal Protection Clause. In light of this probable
outcome, the article urges school officials to consider race-neutral methods to
achieve diversity and to improve the quality of education provided to
disadvantaged, minority students.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2003, after a twenty-five year hiatus,1 the Supreme Court reentered the
passionate and controversial debate surrounding affirmative action in the context
of public education. The Court’s dual decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger2 and
Gratz v. Bollinger3 sanctioned the limited use of race as a factor in higher
education admissions decisions. During the October Term 2006, the Court will
revisit the issue of affirmative action, only this time the inquiry will concern the
use of race in elementary and secondary education rather than higher education.
In a somewhat surprising announcement, the Court decided to hear the
appeals of two cases challenging school districts’ use of race in student
assignment decisions.4 Six months prior to the Court’s decision to hear
arguments in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District
No. 15 and Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education,6 the Court declined
to grant certiorari in a similar case,7 thereby prompting speculation as to the
reasons for its apparent about face. One could attribute the Court’s decision to its
desire to reconcile circuit court splits regarding the constitutionality of raceconscious student assignment plans pre- and post-Grutter.8 While this reason
may be plausible, it would not appear to be the primary reason given that such
1

See Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (analyzing the
constitutionality of race-conscious admissions policies in higher education).
2

539 U.S. 306 (2003).

3

539 U.S. 244 (2003).

4

See Charles Lane, Justices to Hear Cases of Race-Conscious School Placements, THE
WASHINGTON POST, June 6, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/06/05/AR2006060500367.html.
5

Parents Involved in Cmty Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005),
cert. granted 126 S.Ct. 2351 (U.S. June 5, 2006) (No. 05-908) [hereinafter Parents II].
6
McFarland v. Jefferson County Public Sch., 330 F.Supp.2d 834, 861 (W.D.Ky. 2004), aff’d
416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. granted sub nom. Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ.,
126 S.Ct. 2351 (U.S. June 5, 2006) (No. 05-915).
7

See Comfort ex rel. Neumyer v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 283 F.Supp.2d 328 (D. Mass. 2003),
aff’d 418 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 798 (2005) (upholding the use of race in
elementary and secondary education student transfer policies).
8

See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 8-15, Parents Involved, 126 S.Ct. 2351 (No. 05-908),
2006 WL 1579631 (detailing circuits’ conflicting holdings regarding the constitutionality of raceconscious assignment plans and urging the Supreme Court to grant certiorari “to remove
uncertainty and confusion” regarding “how Grutter and Gratz affect the Equal Protection rights of
students in public high schools”; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 8-11, Meredith, 126 S.Ct. 2351
(No. 05-915), 2006 WL 165912 (arguing that the Court should grant cert because “[t]he decision of
the Sixth Circuit directly conflicts with decisions of the Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Circuits concerning
voluntarily-adopted race-based student assignment plans designed to advance racial diversity’); see
also Lane, supra note 4.
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splits existed prior to the Court’s certiorari denial in Lynn.9 Others have
hypothesized that the Court’s decision to grant certiorari was precipitated by the
change in its composition – a change that some think may prove to be the death
knell of desegregation.10
The composition of the Court that declined to hear Lynn included Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor, who wrote the 5 to 4 Grutter opinion upholding the use
of race in higher education. Often thought of as the “swing vote” in controversial
and pivotal cases,11 Justice O’Connor retired from the Court in 2006.12
Following the appointment of her replacement, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., who
is commonly thought to be a conservative justice,13 the newly constituted Court
agreed to hear Parents Involved and Meredith, which will be the first time the
Court has addressed the constitutionality of the voluntary use of race in
elementary and secondary school student assignment plans. While no one can
9

See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 7-10, Lynn, 126 S.Ct. 798, 2005 WL 2275949 (noting
conflicts between the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Ninth Circuits regarding the
constitutionality of public schools voluntarily adopting race-conscious student assignment plans to
achieve racial diversity).
10

See Linda Greenhouse, Court to Weigh Race as Factor in School Rolls, THE NEW YORK
June
6,
2006,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/06/washington/06scotus.html?ex=1307246400&en=7b7b1af6cbe
f8911&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss (suggesting that the change in Supreme Court justices
prompted the Court to grant certiorari); Lane, supra note 4 (quoting Professor Goodwin Liu’s
thoughts of the Court’s granting of cert as ‘bad news for desegregation advocates…. It looks like
the more conservative justices see they have a fifth vote to reverse these case.’).

TIMES,

11
See Tom Curry, O’Connor had immense power as swing vote, July 1, 2005, available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5304484/ (describing Justice O’Connor as “often the swing vote
that decided high-profile cases”); Justice O’Connor’s swing vote clout, available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9531661/ (detailing six significant Supreme Court decisions,
ranging from partial birth abortion to state sovereign immunity, in which Justice O’Connor
provided the fifth deciding vote).
12
Although Justice O’Connor announced her resignation on July 1, 2005, it was not effective
until the confirmation of her successor, which occurred on January 31, 2006 with the swearing in of
Justice Alito. See William Branigin, Fred Barbash & Daniela Deane, Supreme Court Justice
WASHINGTON
POST,
July
1,
2005,
available
at
O'Connor
Resigns,
THE
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/01/AR2005070100653.html; Alito
sworn
in
as
Supreme
Court
justice,
January
31,
2006,
available
at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11111624/.
13

See Alito sworn in, supra note 12 (describing Justice Alito as a “conservative lawyer for the
Reagan administration”); Don Gonyea, Republicans Praise Alito’s Conservative Credentials,
available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4983450 (describing Justice
Alito as “a judicial favorite of the conservative movement”); Bill Mears, Alito's record shows
conservative
judge,
available
at
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/10/31/alito.record/index.html (discussing Justice Alito’s
“conservative judicial philosophy” and relating views that he was “the most conservative member
of the” Third Circuit Court of Appeals).

.

Please do not quote/reproduce

[Ver 1

know how any of the justices will vote in the cases, many affirmative action
opponents hope that the additions of Justice Alito and Chief Justice John G.
Roberts, Jr.14 to the Court will result in the prohibition of race-conscious
assignment programs in public elementary and secondary schools.15 Supporters
of affirmative action fear that such a ruling will prompt and exacerbate
resegregation trends currently plaguing public education.16 Whether the Court
upholds or strikes down the assignment plans employed in the two cases, Parents
Involved and Meredith will significantly contribute to the jurisprudence
concerning equality in public education.
Many agree that public elementary and secondary schools are more
segregated today than they were prior to the Brown decision.17 Current
14
Following the death of Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Chief Justice Roberts was confirmed on
September 29, 2005. See Charles Babington & Peter Baker, Roberts Confirmed as 17th Chief
WASHINGTON
POST,
September
30,
2005,
available
at
Justice,
THE
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/29/AR2005092900859.html.
Although void of a lengthy judicial history, Chief Justice Roberts’ commentary regarding racebased affirmative action prior to taking the bench has led some to believe that he generally opposes
race-based affirmative action.
As Acting Solicitor General, Roberts’ approval of a brief opposing the Federal
Communications Commission’s affirmative action program for broadcast
licensees and later, as a private attorney, his brief on behalf of the Associated
General Contractors of America in opposition to the government’s highway
construction program in Adarand Constructors v. Pena clearly indicate that had
Roberts sat in the place of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, equal access to higher
education (Grutter v. Bollinger) and contracting (Adarand v. Pena) would have
been foreclosed to minorities.
See American Association for Affirmative Action Opposes Confirmation of John Roberts for Chief
Justice
of
U.S.
Supreme
Court,
September
5,
2005,
available
at
http://www.affirmativeaction.org/press.jsp (quoting Robert Ethridge, the American Association for
Affirmative Action’s President).
15
See Lane, supra note 4 (“Sharon Browne, principal attorney of the Pacific Legal
Foundation, which supports the parents’ lawsuits [in Parents Involved and Meredith], said she ‘was
pleased that the Court has decided to hear these cases. Together, these cases could put an end to
schools using race as a factor to decide where children can attend school.’”); Greenhouse, supra
note 9 (quoting Sharon Browne as saying, ‘I think the writing's on the wall, or at least I hope it is.’)
16

See Gina Holland, Supreme Court to Hear Schools Race Case, CBS NEWS, June 5, 2006,
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/06/05/ap/politics/mainD8I2AB700.shtml ( “A
ruling against the schools ‘would be pretty devastating to suburban communities, small towns that
have successfully maintained desegregation for a couple of generations,’ he said. ‘The same
communities that were forced to desegregate would be forced to re-segregate.’”) (quoting Gary
Orfield, Director of the Civil Rights Project at Harvard University); Bob Egelko & Heather Knight,
Justices take cases on race-based enrollment, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, June 6, 2006 (noting
views that the consideration of race in public elementary and secondary schools is necessary to
“reverse growing resegregation of the schools”).
17
See Hon. Robert L. Carter, The Conception of Brown, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 93, 99 (2004)
(concluding that “there are more segregated secondary and primary schools today than existed
before Brown); Marvin Krislov, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: The Value, the Method,
and the Future, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 899, 906 (2004) (concluding that many parts of the country are

2006]

PARENTS INVOLVED & MEREDITH

6 /41

resegregation trends threaten thirty years of progress that have been made in the
desegregation of African-American students,18 thereby impeding the fulfillment
of Brown’s promise of educational equality.
Realizing the potentially
devastating effects of segregated schools,19 several school districts have
voluntarily begun to employ race-conscious student assignment plans, such as
those challenged in Parents Involved and Meredith, to prevent and remedy
resegregation of their schools. This article examines the constitutionality of such
plans and hypothesizes that the Supreme Court will strike down both student
assignment plans employed in Parents Involved and Meredith as
unconstitutional.
Part I begins with an analysis of factors contributing to resegregation in
elementary and secondary schools. Just as the Supreme Court has been an
invaluable tool by which to desegregate public schools, some of its decisions
have also enabled resegregation to flourish. Part I also discusses the negative
impact that school districts’ adherence to the “neighborhood school concept” has
had on the provision of equal educational opportunities to minority students.
Part II examines the District Court and Ninth Circuit’s opinions in
Meredith and Parents Involved. It discusses the compelling interests asserted by
the school districts to justify their narrowly tailored use of race in student
assignment decisions.
Part III analyzes the constitutionality of voluntary race-conscious student
assignment plans as employed in Parents Involved and Meredith. Although
difficult to predict, this article hypothesizes that the Court will invalidate both
student assignment plans as violative of the Equal Protection Clause. This
hypothesis is predicated on the Court’s previous decisions and rationale
concerning the use of race in the context of public education.
The article concludes with suggestions regarding policies and programs
that school districts can utilize in their attempts to combat the severe costs
imposed by racial and economic segregation in public education.

experiencing segregation at levels greater than those existing when Brown was decided); Charles J.
Ogletree, Jr., All Deliberate Speed?: Brown’s Past and Brown’s Future, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 625,
631 (2005) (noting that “public schools in many areas are more segregated than they were before
Brown”); Leland Ware, Race and Urban Space: Hypersegregated Housing Patterns and the
Failure of School Desegregation, 9 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 55, 65 (2002) (stating that “public schools
in many urban communities are more segregated now than they were in the pre-Brown era”).
18
See Erica Frankenberg, Chungmei Lee, & Gary Orfield, A Multiracial Society with
Segregated Schools: Are We Losing the Dream?, Harvard Civil Rights Project Report 4 (2003),
available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg03/finalexec.pdf (discussing a
twelve year decline in the desegregation of African-American students).
19

See infra Part I (discussing the negative effects of resegregation on public education).
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SCHOOL HOUSE ROCK: RESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Throughout our history, public education has occupied a significant role
in our society. Its importance has been the bedrock of legal decisions concerning
the provision of educational opportunities to undocumented children,20 children
with disabilities,21 and minority students.22 As recognized by the Supreme Court
in Brown I:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments…. It is the very foundation of good
citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the
child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the
state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made
available to all on equal terms.23
Unfortunately, Brown I’s recognition of the inherent inequality of
racially segregated schools24 has not prevented such segregation from occurring.
This section explores two factors that have contributed to the resegregation of
public educational institutions: first, the shift in Supreme Court jurisprudence
regarding mandatory desegregation efforts and second, local school districts’
adherence to the “neighborhood school concept” when making student
assignment decisions. The Supreme Court’s dilution of desegregation mandates
and school districts’ use of racially segregated neighborhoods as criteria for
student assignments have both exacerbated the resegregation trends currently
afflicting public educational institutions.

20

See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (invalidating a Texas statute that denied public
education to children not legally admitted to the country).
21
See Cedar Rapids Comm. Sch. Dist. v. Garret, 526 U.S. 66, 78 (1999) (holding that
Congress’ intent “‘to open the door of public education’ to all qualified children” required the
school district to provide nursing services to a quadriplegic student in accordance with federal
disability law) (citing Board of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist., Westchester Cty. v.
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 192 (1982)).
22

See Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter Brown I] (invalidating
segregation of races in public schools); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325 (upholding the narrowly tailored
use of race in higher education admissions decisions).
23
24

Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493.

Id. at 495 (“We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but
equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”) (emphasis added).
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The Court Giveth, the Court Taketh Away

The attainment of equality in public education for racial and ethnic
minority students has often been pursued via legal measures. From Brown I to
Grutter, Supreme Court intervention has helped to open the school house doors
for countless numbers of students of color.25 Despite such access, however,
African-American and Hispanic students continue to lag behind their white
counterparts in terms of academic achievement.26 This phenomenon can be
explained, in part, by the environments in which many minority students are
educated.27
Due to the resegregation trend experienced by many public schools, an
astounding number of African-American and Hispanic children are educated in
racially and economically segregated schools. "[A]lmost three-fourths of black
and Latino students attend schools that are predominantly minority.”28 Of the 2.4
million students attending schools that are 99-100% minority, African-American
and Hispanic students account for 2.3 million.29 Unfortunately, “[t]he schools
25
See Brief Amici Curiae of Veterans of the Southern Civil Rights Movement and Family
Members of Murdered Civil Rights Activists in Support of Respondents at 8, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306
(No. 02-241), 2003 WL 539178 (noting that the number of African-American college graduates has
increased from less than 5% in 1960 to approximately 7.5% in 2000; in addition, the number of
African-American law students has increased from 1% in 1960 to 7.4% in 1996); Danielle R.
Holley, Is Brown Dying? Exploring the Resegregation Trend in our Public Schools, 49 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 1085, 1086 & n.4 (2004-2005) (discussing the positive impact of the Brown decision
on racial integration in public schools); Goodwin Liu & William L. Taylor, School Choice to
Achieve Desegregation, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 791, 791 n.4 (2005):
In 1965, only 15.2% of African-Americans between the ages of twenty-five and
twenty-nine had attended college; by 1995, that number had risen to 44.9%.
Among African-Americans in that age bracket, 15.3% had completed four or
more years of college in 1995, compared to 6.8% in 1965. See James T.
Patterson, Brown v. Board of Education: A Civil Rights Milestone and Its
Troubled Legacy 230 (2001) (citation omitted). In the 1990s, college
enrollment by students of color increased by nearly 50%. See William B.
Harvey, Am. Council on Educ., Minorities in Higher Education 2001-2002:
Nineteenth Annual Status Report 2 (2002).
26
See Eboni S. Nelson, What Price Grutter? We May Have Won the Battle, but Are We Losing
the War? 32 J. C. & U. L. 1, 8-9, 25-26 (2005) (discussing racial disparities in educational
achievement).
27

See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 299-300 (2003) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (noting that
“African-American and Hispanic children are all too often educated in poverty-stricken and
underperforming institutions”).
28

Erica Frankenberg, Chungmei Lee, & Gary Orfield, A Multiracial Society with Segregated
Schools: Are We Losing the Dream?, Harvard Civil Rights Project Report 28 (2003), available at
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg03/AreWeLosingtheDream.pdf.
29

Id.

.
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that have the highest minority enrollment also have the highest incidence of
student poverty: In 87% of schools that are over 90% minority (AfricanAmerican and Hispanic), over half of the students come from families living in
poverty.”30 These figures are particular disturbing when one considers the
disadvantages and challenges that students attending such schools must
overcome to succeed academically.31
Although the Supreme Court has issued decisions to help facilitate the
provision of equal educational opportunities to minority students,32 the Court has
also issued opinions – three, in particular, referred to as the “resegregation
trilogy”33 – that have hindered the progress of desegregation.34 The Court’s
decisions in Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell,35 Freeman v.
Pitts,36 and Missouri v. Jenkins37 have relaxed school districts’ responsibilities
and duties to eliminate all vestiges of racial segregation, thereby permitting the
premature dissolution of federally mandated desegregation decrees when racial
imbalance persists.38
The Supreme Court’s decision in Dowell evidences its reluctance to
continue taking an active role in the desegregation of public educational
30

James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 273 (1999). See also Gary
Orfield & Chungmei Lee, Brown at 50: King's Dream or Plessy's Nightmare?, The Civil Rights
Project
Harvard
Univ.
21
(2004),
available
at
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg04/brown50.pdf (concluding that “students
in highly segregated neighborhood schools are many times more likely to be in schools of
concentrated poverty”).
31

See Orfield & Lee, supra note 30, at 21-22 (detailing poverty concentrated school
disadvantages such as school deterioration, lack of resources, less experienced teachers and fewer
college preparatory courses).
32
See supra notes 22 & 25; see also Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S.
430, 437-438 (1968) (placing an “affirmative duty” on school boards operating segregated systems
“to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial
discrimination would be eliminated root and branch”); Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294,
301 (1955) [hereinafter Brown II] (instructing district courts to enter desegregation decrees that
mandate the admission of African-American students into public schools “with all deliberate
speed”).
33

Ware, supra note 17, at 63.

34

See id. at 65 (referring to the three cases as “a three-fold shift from an affirmative duty to
eliminate all vestiges of segregation to acquiescence to resegregation”).
35

498 U.S. 237 (1991).

36

503 U.S. 467 (1992).

37

515 U.S. 70 (1995).

38

See Nancy Levit, Embracing Segregation: The Jurisprudence of Choice and Diversity in
Race and Sex Separatism in Schools, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 455, 465-473 (discussing the impact of
the three cases on district courts’ decisions to dissolve desegregation orders, “even if desegregation
actually had not been accomplished”).
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institutions39 as it had in previous cases.40 The Court’s decision appears to be
guided by its pronouncement that “federal supervision of local school systems
was intended as a temporary measure to remedy past discrimination.”41 To
hasten the return of educational decisions to local school officials, the Court sets
forth a less stringent test to determine whether a school system has successfully
complied with a desegregation decree so as to warrant its dissolution. Unlike the
Court’s demand in Green that school boards develop systems “in which racial
discrimination would be eliminated root and branch,”42 the Dowell Court
instructs lower courts to ask “whether the Board had complied in good faith with
the desegregation decree…, and whether the vestiges of past discrimination had
been eliminated to the extent practicable.”43 This test appears to concede the
point that the complete elimination of segregation is impractical; therefore,
school districts that demonstrate a good faith effort to desegregate and eliminate
traces of past discrimination can be released from judicial control and
supervision even though circumstances remain that hinder desegregation.44
The Court reiterated the Dowell test in Freeman45 as it continued to chip
away at the desegregation safeguards that it had previously helped to establish.
In Freeman, respondents argued that a district court should not relinquish its
supervision and control over a school system until the school district fully

39

See Holley, supra note 25, at 1090 & n.31 (describing the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Dowell, Freeman and Jenkins as evidence of its “hostility towards federal court supervision of
school desegregation”).
40

See supra note 32; see also Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 471,
487 (1982) (striking down a state initiative intended to “interfere with desegregative busing”);
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25, 30 (1971) (upholding the ordering
of a racial balance requirement and bus transportation as permissible tools of school desegregation).
41

Dowell, 498 U.S. at 248 (emphasis added); id. (stating that desegregation decrees “are not
intended to operate in perpetuity). Some scholars suggest that such statements evidence the Court’s
“impatience with the duration of desegregation orders,” or perhaps, “an abandonment of the
original purpose” of desegregation. See Levit, supra note 38, at 472 & n.91.
42

Green, 391 U.S. at 438; see also Swann, 402 U.S. at 15 (stating that the Supreme Court’s
objective “remains to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation”)
(emphasis added).
43

Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249-250 (emphasis added).

44
See Holley, supra note 25, at 1092 (concluding that the Dowell test excludes the possibility
of resegregation as a factor for determining unitary status so as to warrant the dissolution of a
desegregation decree); Levit, supra note 38, at 464-465 (discussing the Dowell test as an invitation
to lower courts to dissolve desegregation decrees even if segregation continues to exist); Ware,
supra note 17, at 64 (concluding that the Dowell test allows for a finding of unitary status despite a
showing that schools remained racially segregated due to housing patterns)
45

Freeman, 503 U.S. at 492.

.
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complies with all components of a desegregation decree.46 The Court rejected
this argument and sanctioned the incremental withdrawal of judicial supervision
once a school system is determined to be in compliance with certain categories of
a desegregation order.47 In arriving at its decision, the Court once again relies
heavily on its desire to return control of school systems to state and local
officials.48
Guided by the “ultimate objective…to return school districts to the
control of local authorities,” the Court reasons that such restoration is “essential
to restore [local authorities’] true accountability in our governmental system.”49
One must be mindful, however, that local authorities’ previous control of school
systems resulted in unequal and segregated dual systems – systems that
necessitated the imposition of court-ordered desegregation decrees in attempts to
remedy them. Over ten years passed before the local school officials in Freeman
took affirmative steps to adhere to the Supreme Court’s mandate that school
districts desegregate “with all deliberate speed,”50 and such steps were initiated
only after the respondents filed their lawsuit.51 At the time the Court decided
Freeman, over thirty-five years had passed since its decision in Brown II;
nevertheless, the local DeKalb County school officials continued to operate a
school system that was violative of the desegregation order.52 Such failures and
delayed action should cause district courts and the Supreme Court pause when
considering the arguably premature return of school systems to local control.
The Freeman decision may also hinder desegregation efforts because of
its discussion regarding a school district’s duty (or lack thereof) to remedy racial
imbalance that continues to exist in its schools. The respondents in Freeman
presented evidence demonstrating the continuance of racial imbalance in DeKalb
County schools.53 Petitioners argued that such imbalance was not caused by
prior de jure discrimination; rather, it was due to demographic changes within the

46

See id. at 471.

47

See id. at 490-491.

48

See id. at 489-490 (“Partial relinquishment of judicial control…can be an important and
significant step in fulfilling the district court’s duty to return the operations and control of schools
to local authorities.”).
49

Id. at 490.

50

Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301.

51

See Freeman, 503 U.S. at 472 (describing the school system’s reluctant response to
desegregation mandates).
52
See id. at 474 (discussing the District Court’s findings that the school system continued to
be segregated with regards to “teacher and principal assignments, resource allocation, and quality
of education”).
53

See id. at 476-477.

PARENTS INVOLVED & MEREDITH

2006]

12 /41

county.54 The Supreme Court rejected the Eleventh Circuit’s contention that the
school district “bore the responsibility for the racial imbalance, and in order to
correct that imbalance would have to take actions that ‘may be administratively
awkward, inconvenient, and even bizarre in some situations.’”55 The Court
clarified that “[o]nce racial imbalance traceable to the constitutional violation has
been remedied, a school district is under no duty to remedy an imbalance that is
caused by demographic factors.”56 When coupled with the Court’s sanctioning
of the incremental withdrawal of judicial supervision once a school district has
been deemed to have complied with certain provisions of a desegregation decree,
this pronouncement begs the question with whom does the duty lie to desegregate
schools if it does not lie with local school districts? If, as in Freeman, school
districts are partially or fully released from their desegregation orders even
though their minority students continue to attend racially segregated schools,
then the likelihood of achieving true desegregation in public education and the
benefits that arise from such educational environments is doubtful.
School districts’ ability to remedy resegregation of their educational
institutions may be further hindered by the Supreme Court’s decision in Jenkins.
The District Court in Jenkins ordered a variety of educational programs and
initiatives in its efforts to improve the educational quality of the Kansas City,
Missouri School District and to eliminate all vestiges of segregation.57 The two
measures challenged by the State were salary increases for instructional and
noninstructional staff and remedial quality education programs.58 The State
argued that the requirement of salary increases for teachers and non-teaching
staff exceeded the District Court’s remedial authority.59 In upholding the State’s
challenge, the Supreme Court agreed that a District Court cannot use
‘interdistrict’ measures to remedy ‘intradistrict’ constitutional violations.60
Concluding that measures such as salary increases were motivated by the District

54

See id. at 478.

55

Id. at 485 (citing Swann, 402 U.S. at 28).

56

Id. at 469.

57

See Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 75-80 (describing District Court’s ordering of class reductions,
magnet school programs, capital improvements and salary increases as measures to improve
academic achievement and remedy effects of segregation).
58

Id. at 80.

59

Id. at 84.

60

Id. at 89-98 (citation omitted).
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Court’s pursuit of ‘desegregative attractiveness,’61 the Court rejected the Eighth
Circuit’s contention that ‘[v]oluntary interdistrict remedies may be used to make
meaningful integration possible in a predominantly minority district.’62 This
rejection greatly restricts District Courts’ ability to fashion effective measures
that can be used to remedy the devastating effects of segregation.
Perhaps one of the most harmful lingering effects of segregation is
minority students’ lack of academic achievement.63 Greater numbers of AfricanAmerican students fail to complete high school as compared to white students.64
African-American students, many of whom attend racial imbalanced schools,
routinely score lower than their white counterparts on standardized tests.65
Fewer African-American adults, as compared to white adults, obtain a college
education.66 Such achievement gaps are due in part to disparities existing
between teacher quality at poor, minority concentrated schools and their more
affluent, white counterparts.
61

Id. at 80. According to the Court, “desegregative attractiveness” refers to the
implementation of programs and initiatives that will improve the attractiveness of schools within a
school district such that nonminority students who are not presently attending schools within the
district will decide to enroll, thereby helping to desegregate the schools. See id. at 98-100.
62

Id. at 91 (citing Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295, 1302 (8th Cir. 1988)).

63
See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494 (noting that segregation has a negative impact on the
educational development of African-American children); Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, Achieving
Equality of Educational Opportunity in the Wake of Judicial Retreat From Race Sensitive
Remedies: Lessons From North Carolina, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1477, 1485 & n.33 (2003) (citing
research showing segregation’s adverse effects on minority students’ academic achievements);
Lisa J. Holmes, Comment, After Grutter: Ensuring Diversity in K-12 Schools, 52 UCLA L. REV.
563, 586-587 (2004) (discussing research suggesting that segregated educational environments may
have detrimental effects on the academic development of minority children).
64

In 2004, the drop out rate for African-Americans age 16-24 was 11.8% as compared to 6.8%
for Whites. See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2006, STATUS
DROPOUT
RATES
BY
RACE/ETHNICITY
(2006),
available
at
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/2006/section3/table.asp?tableID=481.
65

See Keith R. Walsh, Color-blind Racism in Grutter and Gratz, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J.
443, 450-451 (2004) (discussing the gap between African-American and white students’ scores on
standardized admissions tests); Michael J. Songer, Note, Decline of Title VII Disparate Impact: The
Role of the 1991 Civil Rights Act and the Ideologies of Federal Judges, 11 Mich. J. Race & L. 247,
267-268 (2005) (footnotes omitted):
The most recent study by the Civil Rights Project at Harvard University found
that 70% of minority children attend American schools with majority-minority
populations. More than one-third of these children attend schools that are
comprised of at least 90% African American students. African American
students continue to score significantly lower than White students on
standardized tests used in college and graduate school admissions.
66
See Walsh, supra note 65, at 450 & n.49 (noting that 28% of white adults are college
educated as compared to 16% of African-American adults and that “[a]s of 2000, only 17.8% of
African Americans over the age of twenty-five had completed four or more years of college, while
34% of their white counterparts could say the same”).
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For example, novice teachers, who are obviously not as qualified as more
experienced teachers, are disproportionately assigned to high poverty, majorityminority schools.67 The percentage of high school students attending highminority, high-poverty schools that are taught English, science and mathematics
by “teachers who have neither a major nor certification in the subject they teach”
is twice the percentage of students encountering the same experience at schools
with low minority and poverty populations.68 Obviously, such disparities have a
detrimental impact on minority students’ academic achievement. If such
disparities could be rectified, then the positive impact on student achievement
could be tremendous, and the hope of eliminating all vestiges of segregation
could become a reality.
This is what the District Court in Jenkins attempted to accomplish by
ordering the State to fund salary increases in its desegregation efforts.69
Remedial measures such as salary increases can positively affect teacher quality
disparities and, consequently, student achievement disparities, by attracting more
highly qualified teachers and personnel to minority concentrated schools.
Exposing minority students to more experienced, more educated and more
effective teachers will improve their educational opportunities and lessen the
detrimental effects of segregation and past discrimination.70 Unfortunately, by
finding that the District Court exceeded its remedial authority by ordering salary
increases for school personnel, the Supreme Court deprives District Courts of a
valuable tool in their efforts to eradicate vestiges of segregation and create
educational equality.
The establishment of equality in public education for racial and ethnic
minority students is also threatened by the Court’s admonition regarding the use
of student achievement levels as a measure to determine partial unitary status.
After finding that the school district “had not reached anywhere close to its
‘maximum potential because the District is still at or below national norms at
67

Novice teachers are assigned to minority concentrated schools at twice the rate as those
assigned to schools with low minority populations. See Heather G. Peske & Kati Haycock,
Teaching Inequality How Poor and Minority Students are Shortchanged on Teacher Quality 2,
available
at
http://www2.edtrust.org/NR/rdonlyres/010DBD9F-CED8-4D2B-9E0D91B446746ED3/0/TQReportJune2006.pdf.
68
See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2004, OUT-OF-FIELD
TEACHING BY POVERTY CONCENTRATION AND MINORITY ENROLLMENT, available at
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/2004/section4/indicator24.asp; see also Peske & Haycock, supra
note 67, at 3 (noting that “in secondary schools serving the most minority students, almost one in
three classes are assigned to an out-of-field teacher compared to about one in five in low-minority
schools”).
69
70

See Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 80.

See Peske & Haycock, supra note 67, at 10 (noting research findings indicating the positive
impact interaction with highly effective teachers can have on low-performing students).
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many grade levels,’”71 the District Court ordered the State to continue funding
quality education programs designed to improve the educational achievement of
all students, especially African-Americans.72 The State challenged the order on
the grounds that improvement on test scores is not a requirement to achieve
partial unitary status.73 In upholding the State’s challenge, the Court directed the
District Court to “sharply limit, if not dispense with, its reliance on” student
performance on achievement tests in its determination of partial unitary status.74
Although the District Court maintained that a school district must achieve its
“maximum potential” regarding its desegregation efforts before it can be deemed
to have partially complied with a desegregation decree, the Supreme Court
rejected this test and re-imposed the lower standard of “practicability” as
articulated in Dowell.75 By rejecting the District Court’s more stringent test, the
Court invites premature findings of partial unitary status despite the fact that
minority students continue to suffer from reductions in academic achievement.
The Court also extends this invitation by its directive to the District
Court to be mindful of its end goal to return control of a school system to state
and local officials.76 In its efforts to expedite the return of educational decisions
to local control, the Court appears to have abandoned its previous stance ‘that the
court has not merely the power but the duty to render a decree which will so far
as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like
discrimination in the future.’77 As shown by the number of schools experiencing
resegregation following the dissolution of desegregation decrees,78 the
71

Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 101.

72

Id. at 73.

73

Id. at 101.

74

Id.

75

See id. (stating the partial unitary test as “whether the reduction in achievement by minority
students attributable to prior de jure segregation has been remedied to the extent practicable)
(emphasis added).
76

See id. at 102.

77

Green, 391 U.S. at 438 n.4 (quoting Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965)).

78

See, e.g., John Charles Boger, Education’s “Perfect Storm”? Racial Resegregation, HighStakes Testing, and School Resource Inequities: The Case of North Carolina, 81 N. C. L. REV.
1375, 1394-1395 (2003) (noting the resegregation consequences flowing from the dissolution of a
thirty-year-old desegregation decree) (footnote omitted):
The consequences flowing from the [Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Schools] ruling were swift and dramatic: in the 2002-2003 school year, the
number of Charlotte-Mecklenburg schools with minority enrollment of 91% to
100% more than doubled from the previous year-- from seven elementary
schools in 2001-2002 to sixteen in 2002-2003, and from two middle schools to
four. There was no change in the number of elementary and middle schools
with minority enrollment of 20% or less.

2006]

PARENTS INVOLVED & MEREDITH

16 /41

withdrawal of judicial oversight, based on the relaxed standards of Dowell,
Freeman, and Jenkins, has had a negative impact both on the elimination of
discriminatory effects and on the prevention of such harmful effects in the
future.79 Such impact is due, in part, to local officials’ reliance on the
“neighborhood school concept” when making student assignment decisions. As
demonstrated in the following section, employing student assignment methods
that are based on racially segregated neighborhoods produces resegregation in
public education and the detrimental effects that accompany such environments.
B.

The Neighborhood School Dilemma

Historically, the neighborhood school concept, which calls for the
assignment of students to schools that are in close proximity to their homes, has
been a preferred method for making school assignment decisions.80 Many argue
that adherence to neighborhood schools provide educational benefits ranging
from increased parental and community involvement that results in improved
student achievement81 to reductions in transportation costs, which provide

See also Holley, supra note 25, at 1095-1096 & n.60 (noting that thirty-four of the thirty-eight
school districts that have achieved unitary status since the Dowell decision have experienced
resegregation as measured by “a decrease in the exposure of black students to white students, and
the exposure of Latino students to white students”).
79

See Orfield & Lee, supra note 30, at 18 (attributing the resegregation trend “to the impact of
three Supreme Court decisions between 1991 and 1995 limiting school desegregation and
authorizing a return to segregated neighborhood schools”).
80

See Swann, 402 U.S. at 28 (noting the Supreme Court’s recognition that “[a]ll things being
equal…it might well be desirable to assign pupils to schools nearest their homes”); see also Levit,
supra note 38, at 456 & n.6 (referring to state initiatives to pass and implement “Neighborhood
Schools Acts”). Student assignments based on proximity to one’s home are especially favored
when compared to the alternative of busing. See Davison M. Douglas, The Quest for Freedom in
the Post-Brown South: Desegregation and White Self-Interest, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 689, 746-747
(2004) (quoting former North Carolina Governor Robert Scott as stating, ‘The neighborhoodschool concept has been the strength of our public education system in North Carolina and our state
has been committed to that policy for some time. It is sound educational policy and must be
preserved.’) (citation omitted); Id. at 747 (quoting former President Richard Nixon as describing
neighborhood schools as ‘the most appropriate…system’) (citation omitted); Levit, supra note 38,
at 456 & n.5 (referring to Congressional anti-busing legislation setting forth the government’s
official policy that “students attend neighborhood schools”).
81

See Patrick James McQuillan & Kerry Suzanne Englert, The Return to Neighborhood
Schools, Concentrated Poverty, and Educational Opportunity: An Agenda for Reform, 28
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 739, 743 (2001).
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additional funding for teacher salaries and educational programs.82 These
benefits, however, are greatly outweighed by the detrimental effects that
accompany many neighborhood school decisions: namely, the resegregation of
elementary and secondary schools and the overwhelming challenges that are
present in such environments.
Following the termination of desegregation decrees and the return of
educational decisions to local control, many school districts returned to the
neighborhood school concept when making their student assignment decisions.83
Considering the rate of residential segregation in communities throughout the
country, it is not surprising that such decisions have resulted in the resegregation
of public schools.84 ‘One-third of all African Americans in the United States live
under conditions of intense racial segregation.’85 In 2000, over 230 American
urban communities could be described as ‘hypersegregated’ or ‘partially
segregated.’86 Therefore, in accordance with student assignment policies that
assign students to schools based on neighborhood proximity, schools populated

82
See Kenneth O'Neil Salyer, Beyond Zelman: Reinventing Neighborhood Schools, 33 J.L. &
EDUC. 283, 287-288 (2004) (discussing the advantages of neighborhood schools). Other proffered
advantages of neighborhood schools include the following: reduction in student-teacher ratios,
reduction in travel safety hazards, creation of sense of community, and simplification of student
assignment policies. Id. See also Kevin Brown, Has the Supreme Court Allowed the Cure for De
Jure Segregation to Replicate the Disease, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 35 (1992).
83

See Molly S. McUsic, The Future of Brown v. Board of Education: Economic Integration of
the Public Schools, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1334, 1342 (2004) (noting school districts’ reversion to
“neighborhood schools placed in segregated neighborhoods”); Myron Orfield, Choice, Equal
Protection, and Metropolitan Integration: The Hope of the Minneapolis Desegregation Settlement,
24 LAW & INEQ. 269, 294, 322-323 (2006) (discussing the impact of termination of desegregation
decrees and reinstitution of neighborhood schools on the resegregation of Minneapolis schools);
Speech by Theodore M. Shaw: “From Brown to Grutter: The Legal Struggle for Racial Equality,
16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 43, 52 (2004) (recounting of incident in which the Norfolk Virginia
School District expressed “its intention to return to neighborhood schools by abandoning its
desegregation plan after a declaration of unitary status”).
84

See Michael Selmi, Race in the City: The Triumph of Diversity and the Loss of Integration,
22 J.L. & POL. 49, 69 (2006) (noting that school segregation follows housing segregation); Ware,
supra note 17, at 56 (attributing the failure of desegregation efforts in many urban schools to
pervasive segregated housing patterns).
85

See Ware, supra note 17, at 65 (citing Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, AMERICAN
APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 74-78 (Harvard Univ. Press
1994)).
86

See Boger, supra note 78, at 1402 & n.97 (detailing residential segregation levels in
metropolitan areas).
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by students living in these areas will also experience high levels of racial
segregation,87 which often brings about adverse educational consequences.
Research shows that students attending racially segregated schools,
which are often economically segregated as well,88 encounter tremendous
challenges that greatly hinder their educational achievement. Students attending
schools with majority minority student populations are often educated in
‘substandard and deteriorating facilities.’89 Their learning environments often
suffer from “shortages of library books, computers, or laboratory equipment.”90
The teachers who educate them are often less qualified than those teaching at
racially and economically diverse schools.91 This lack of resources leads to
disparities in minority students’ academic achievement as measured by

87

See id. at 1400 (predicting that “residential segregation will prove especially likely to lead to
school resegregation if districts choose student assignment strategies based on neighborhood
schools”); id. at 1407-1408 (discussing racial segregation increases in North Carolina schools
following the implementation of neighborhood schools assignment plans); Gary Orfield &
Chungmei Lee, Racial Transformation and the Changing Nature of Segregation, Harvard Civil
Rights
Project
9
(2006)
available
at
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/deseg/Racial_Transformation.pdf (noting that
“[s]ince the Supreme Court authorized a return to segregated neighborhood schools. . ., the
percentage of black students attending majority nonwhite schools increased in all regions from 66
percent in 1991 to 73 percent in 2003-4).
88

See supra note 30 and accompanying text.

89

See Levit, supra note 38, at 497 (citing Leland Ware, Redlining Learners: Delaware’s
Neighborhood Schools Act, 20 DEL. LAW. 14, 16 (2002)).
90

Boger, supra note 78, at 1382.

91

See id.; Levit, supra note 38, at 498; supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.

.

Please do not quote/reproduce

[Ver 1

standardized tests scores,92 high school drop out and graduation rates,93 college
matriculation rates,94 and post-graduate degrees.95
Not only are students attending segregated schools forced to overcome
educational resources deficiencies, but they are also deprived of the educational
benefits related to interacting with students who possess higher educational
aspirations. Unfortunately, many minority students who live in lower-income,
racially segregated neighborhoods and attend lower-performing schools within
those neighborhoods have low expectations regarding academic achievement. In
fact, some minority communities suffer from a culture that devalues academic
success,96 which significantly undermines minority students’ academic
expectations and aspirations. As noted by scholar John Charles Boger:
A pupil’s achievement is strongly related to the educational
backgrounds and aspirations of the other students in the
school….Thus…if a minority pupil from a home without much
educational strength is put with schoolmates with strong
educational backgrounds, his achievement is likely to increase.97
If, in fact, “the social characteristics of a school’s student body [are] the single
most important school-related factor in predicting minority student
achievement,”98 student assignment plans that rely on poor, racially segregated
92
See Curt A. Levey, Racial Preferences in Admissions: Myths, Harms, and Alternatives, 66
ALB. L. REV. 489, 502 (2003) (discussing racial disparities in minority and nonminority students’
standardized test scores); Keith R. Walsh, Color-blind Racism in Grutter and Gratz, 24 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 443, 449-51 (2004) (discussing disparities between Blacks and Whites
regarding their performance on standardized tests).
93

In 2004, the high school drop out rate for African-American students age 16-24 was 11.8%
compared to 6.8% for their white counterparts. See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE
CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2006, STATUS DROPOUT RATES BY RACE/ETHNICITY (2006), available at
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/2006/section3/table.asp?tableID=481. In 2005, fewer Blacks than
Whites age 25 - 29 years old had completed high school (87% vs. 93%). See NAT’L CTR. FOR
EDUC. STATISTICS, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2006, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT TBL. 31-1
(2006), available at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/2006/section3/table.asp?tableID=492.
94

In 2005, only 49.0% of African-Americans between the ages of 25-29 had completed at
least some college as compared to 64.3% of Whites. See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE
CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2006, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT TBL. 31-2 (2006), available at
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/2006/section3/table.asp?tableID=493; see also A. Mechele
Dickerson, Race Matters in Bankruptcy, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1725, 1769-1770 (2004).
95

In 2005, 34.1% of Whites between the ages of 25-29 had obtained a bachelor’s degree or
higher while only 17.5% of Blacks had achieved the same educational success. See NAT’L CTR.
FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2006, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT TBL. 31-3
(2006), available at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/2006/section3/table.asp?tableID=494.
96

See Nelson, supra note 26, at 26 & n.127.

97

Boger, supra note 78, at 1415 (citing James S. Coleman et al., EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY 22 (1966)).
98

Id.
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neighborhoods will only exacerbate the current disparities existing between
minority and non-minority student achievement.
Considering the detrimental impact the creation of neighborhood schools
has on desegregation efforts and, consequently, the quality of education received
by many minority students, one wonders why school boards continue to advocate
for and create them. While school boards’ decisions to adhere to neighborhood
schools may be attributable, in part, to their purported benefits,99 parents’ vocal
opposition to busing and school boundary proposals has also greatly influenced
school boards’ actions. Due to the fact that the overwhelming majority of school
boards are elected positions,100 their members must confront political pressures
that are brought to bear upon them by their constituents. Having particular
influence on school board members are those voting parents who organize in
efforts to oppose school boundary and student assignment proposals that attempt
to diversify schools, both in terms of race and socioeconomic status.101
The school board members elected to govern the Humble Independent
School District in Humble, Texas faced similar opposition in 2003 after
announcing their proposals to redraw school boundaries.102 Because some of the
99

See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.

100

See Frederick M. Hess, SCHOOL BOARDS AT THE DAWN OF THE 21ST CENTURY 5 (2002)
(reporting that in a survey of 2000 school boards, 93% were entirely elected), available at
http://www.nsba.org/site/docs/1200/1143.pdf.
101

While parent groups comprise 52.1% of constituent groups that are “active” in school
board elections, ethnic or racial groups only comprise 18.1%. See id. at 37. See also Boger, supra
note 78, at 1399-1400 (discussing parents’ resistance efforts to the proposal of assigning poor, lowperforming students to schools where their children attended and to the reassignment of white,
middle-class students to lower income, lower performing schools); Dana Banker, Plantation
Parents Join Busing Debate School Boundaries Face Challenge at Meeting, SOUTH FL. SUNSENTINEL, March 27, 1995, at 1B, available in 1995 WLNR 4830234 (stating the goal of parents
who oppose school boundary proposals that would require their children to be bused to a
predominantly Black school to “[m]ake board members realize that this Plantation [parent]
contingent is a sizable group with which to be reckoned”); John Hill, Good schools for all
Hillsborough, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 13, 2006, at 12A, available in 2006 WLNR 8296371
(stating that “[p]arents of upscale Westchase scolded, taunted and threatened the elected board with
political retaliation” because of their discontentment regarding the school board’s student
reassignment proposal); Ginger Jenkins, Boundary Committee endures wrath of Fall Creek
residents,
April
11,
2004,
available
at
http://www.hcnonline.com/site/index.cfm?newsid=11289350&BRD=1574&PAG=461&dept_id=5
32207&rfi=8&xb=lutex (discussing parents’ vocal opposition to school boundary proposals that
would zone their children to Title 1 schools, which have high economically-disadvantaged student
populations); Scott Travis, Parents Protest Plan to Alter School Boundary, SOUTH FL. SUNSENTINEL, Sept. 12, 2000, at 1B, available in 2000 WLNR 8568161 (discussing parents’ opposition
to a school boundary proposal that would add 163 predominantly poor, African-American students
to their children’s elementary school).
102
See Cindy Horswell, School boundaries draw parents’ wrath/Humble ISD stirs campus
controversy, HOUS. CHRON., November 15, 2003, at A31, available in 2003 WLNR 16389739.
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boundary proposals called for certain middle-upper class, predominantly white
neighborhoods to be zoned to schools that would have predominantly minority,
lower income student populations, parents and residents residing in the
predominantly white neighborhoods voiced their dissent and lobbied school
board members to vote to keep their children at the “good” schools.103 Although
the decision was not unanimous, the school board acquiesced and voted to accept
boundary proposals that would allow the parents’ children to attend the more
desirable schools.104 Unfortunately, the same boundary decision also created
racially and economically segregated schools due to the extraction of white,
middle-class students.105
If school board members continue to employ student assignment policies
that rely on racially segregated housing patterns and to yield to political parental
pressures that oppose diversification and, thereby, desegregation efforts, then the
goal of attaining educational equality for minority students will be unrealized. In
attempts to avoid the harmful costs associated with resegregation, some school
districts have voluntarily implemented plans that consider students’ race when
making student assignment decisions. The next section examines two such plans
and their attempts to further compelling interests via constitutional means.
II.
TAKING MATTERS INTO THEIR OWN HANDS:
PUBLIC SCHOOLS’ VOLUNTARY USE OF RACE-CONSCIOUS STUDENT
ASSIGNMENT PLANS
Due to the resegregation trend that is currently plaguing American public
educational institutions, school districts have begun to experiment with various
measures intended to diversify elementary and secondary schools. School
districts have implemented school choice programs whereby parents can decide

103

See Linda Gilchriest, Tough Choices/Humble ISD must decide controversial lines issues,
Hous. Chron., July 10, 2003, at 1, available in 2003 WLNR 16369914 (discussing Fall Creek’s
(“an upscale subdivision with million-dollar homes”) opposition to being zoned to Humble High
School “because it would have a greater number of minority and economically disadvantaged
students”); see also Jenkins, supra note 101.
104
See Kristen Wright, Humble ISD adopts new boundaries/New Kingwood Park to be scaled
down, Hous. Chron., Sept. 2, 2004, at 1, available in 2004 WLNR 20930185.
105

Following adoption of the new boundaries, Humble High School was projected to be 45%65% minority and 45%-55% economically disadvantaged. Meanwhile, more affluent Kingwood
High School was projected to have a student body that was only 10%-20% minority and 5-15%
economically disadvantaged. The newly created high school (to which parents lobbied school board
members to have their children attend) was projected to be 30%-50% minority and only 15%-25%
economically disadvantaged. See DEMOGRAPHIC PROJECTIONS CORE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATION
(on file with author).
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which schools they would like for their child to attend.106 To encourage parents
to choose schools that may have high populations of minority, economicallydisadvantaged students, many school districts have introduced programs that
provide pre-college courses of study such as the International Baccalaureate (IB)
Diploma Program at such schools.107 School districts have also created magnet
schools and programs, which have a particular theme or curricular focus, such as
science, technology, mathematics or performing arts, in their efforts to achieve
diverse student bodies.108
Schools have also taken a more direct approach to achieve their diversity
goals by considering students’ race and ethnicity when making student
assignment decisions. Such consideration has subjected school districts to
intense and, in some cases, fatal judicial scrutiny.109 The school districts in the
following two cases, however, successfully overcame the constitutional
challenges launched against their race-conscious student assignment plans at the
circuit court level. It remains to be seen whether the same will be true following
the Supreme Court’s consideration of the plans.
A.

McFarland v. Jefferson County Board of Education

106

See Robert A. Frahm, Court Takes On Race Case School Desegregation Could Be Affected,
HARTFORD COURANT, June 6, 2006, at A1, available in 2006 WLNR 9686740 (discussing
Connecticut’s use of school choice to promote racial diversity in elementary and secondary
education)
107
In 2006, the Humble Independent School District in Humble, TX announced its plans to
institute the IB Diploma Program at Humble High School, which is the most racially diverse and
economically-disadvantaged high school in the district. See What in the World is IB?, available at
http://www.humble.k12.tx.us/ibpage.htm. During the 2004-2005 school year, 25.4% of Humble
High School’s student population was economically disadvantaged, compared to only 3.3% at
Kingwood High School. The minority enrollment at Humble High School is also significantly
greater than that at Kingwood High School (50.6% vs. 14%). See 2004-2005 ACADEMIC
EXCELLENCE
INDICATOR
SYSTEM
CAMPUS
REPORTS,
available
at
http://www.tea.state.tx.us/perfreport/aeis/2005/campus.srch.html.
108
See Hill, supra note 101 (discussing a school district’s implementation of school choice as
a means to “maintain integrated schools by making them more attractive to residents outside their
neighborhoods”); Harold A. McDougall, Brown at Sixty: The Case for Black Reparations, 47 HOW.
L.J. 863, 892 (2004) (discussing the goal of magnet schools “to accomplish or maintain
desegregation”).
109

See, e.g., Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999)
(invalidating a race-conscious student transfer plan that denied students’ transfer requests if they
would have an adverse impact on the assigned or requested school’s diversity levels); Tuttle v.
Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999) (invalidating an assignment plan that
based admission into an alternative kindergarten in part on students’ race and ethnicity); Wessman
v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998) (invalidating Boston Latin School’s race-conscious
admissions policy).
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In its attempts to maintain an integrated school system following the
lifting of a desegregation decree, the Jefferson County Public Schools (the
“Board”) implemented a student assignment plan that includes racial
guidelines.110 While students have the ability to choose which school they would
like to attend, their ultimate assignment can be affected by the operation of the
racial guidelines, which require African-American student enrollment to be “at
least 15% and no more than 50%” of the student body.111 Although many other
non-racial factors affect student assignment, the racial guidelines prohibit some
students’ admission into particular schools or academic programs based on their
race.112
Because of such effect, students and parents challenged the
constitutionality of the Board’s race-conscious student assignment plan.
In reviewing the constitutionality of the plan, the District Court applied
strict scrutiny, which requires the Board to demonstrate that its use of race
furthers a compelling governmental interest and does so using narrowly tailored
means.113 In formulating what appears to be a novel justification for the use of
race in education, the Court held that the maintenance of racially integrated
elementary and secondary schools constitutes a compelling interest.114 In
assessing the Board’s asserted interests,115 the Court found that the educational
and societal benefits that are derived from racial diversity in higher education are
also produced in the context of elementary and secondary education.116 The
Court accepted the Board’s argument that “school integration benefits the system
as a whole by creating a system of roughly equal components…not one rich and
another poor, not one Black and another White.”117 Finally, in holding that the
Board’s interests are compelling, the Court held that the Board was not engaged
in unconstitutional “racial balancing” because of its demonstrated commitment to

110

See McFarland, 330 F.Supp.2d at 836.

111

Id. at 842.

112

See id.

113

See id. at 837, 848-849.

114

See id. at 855.

115

The Court’s statement of the Board’s asserted interests is as follows:
To give all students the benefits of an education in a racially integrated school and to
maintain community commitment to the entire school system precisely express the
Board's own vision of Brown 's promise. The benefits the JCPS hopes to achieve go to the
heart of its educational mission: (1) a better academic education for all students; (2) better
appreciation of our political and cultural heritage for all students; (3) more competitive
and attractive public schools; and (4) broader community support for all JCPS schools.
Id. at 850 & n.29.
116

See id. at 853.

117

Id. at 854.
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integration and educational equality and the “academic, social and institutional
benefits [they] achieve[ ].”118
Not only did the District Court find that the Board used race in its pursuit
of compelling interests, but it also concluded that, in most respects, it utilized
narrowly tailored means to pursue such interests.119 The Court applied the
following four criteria in determining the constitutionality of the race-conscious
student assignment plan:
(1) whether the 2001 Plan amounts to a quota that seeks a fixed
number of desirable minority students and insulates one group of
applicants from another, (2) whether the applicant is afforded
individualized review, (3) whether the 2001 Plan "unduly
harm[s] members of any racial group," and (4) whether JCPS
has given "serious, good faith consideration of workable raceneutral alternatives" to achieve its goals.120
In finding that the racial guidelines did not operate as a quota, the District Court
reasoned that they represented a “quite flexible and broad target range,” such as
that permitted in Grutter, and not a “relatively precise target.”121 This reasoning,
however, fails to address the fact that the “target range” is actually a Board
requirement that African-American students comprise 15%-50% of a school’s
student enrollment.122 The Board’s formulation of its diversity goal as a
numerical mandate may prove to be fatal in its quest to seek constitutional
approval from the Supreme Court.123
Related to the quota criteria is the narrowly tailored requirement that
race-conscious student assignment plans afford each student holistic,
individualized review. Unlike other courts that have held that the requirement is
inapplicable in the context of elementary and secondary education,124 the District
118

Id. at 855.

119

See id. at 855-862.

120

Id. at 856 (internal citations omitted).

121

Id. at 857. The Court also relied on the varying actual percentages of Black students present
at individual schools (20.1%-50.4%) to support its conclusion that the guidelines did not operate as
a quota. See id.
122
See id. at 842 (stating that “the 2001 Plan requires each school to seek a Black student
enrollment of at least 15% and no more than 50%) (emphasis added).
123
124

For further discussion, see infra Part III.

See, e.g., Parents II, 426 F.3d at 1183 (concluding “that if a noncompetitive, voluntary
student assignment plan is otherwise narrowly tailored, a district need not consider each student in
a individualized, holistic manner”); Comfort, 418 F.3d at 18 (“Unlike the Gratz and Grutter
policies, the Lynn Plan is designed to achieve racial diversity rather than viewpoint diversity. The
only relevant criterion, then, is a student's race; individualized consideration beyond that is
irrelevant to the compelling interest.) (footnote omitted).
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Court considered the requirement and found that the Board’s plan allows for
individualized review, albeit “of a different kind in a different context than the
Supreme Court found in Grutter.”125 The Court reasoned that the Board
considers many aspects of each student’s application when determining student
assignments. “[R]ace is simply one possible factor among many, acting only
occasionally as a permissible “tipping” factor in most of the [Board] assignment
process.”126 Because the Board successfully demonstrated that its plan complied
with this as well as the other narrowly tailored requirements, the Court concluded
that its use of race in student assignments was constitutionally permissible.127
B.

Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1

Employing similar rationale as that utilized by the Board in McFarland,
the Seattle School District Number 1 (the “District”) also adopted an open choice
student assignment plan in its attempts to create racially diverse schools and to
prevent racial imbalance that would result from adherence to the neighborhood
school concept. The plan allows parents to choose which of the ten high schools
they want their children to attend, provided a particular school has availability.128
To address situations in which a school is oversubscribed,129 the District employs
four tiebreakers, the second one being a student’s race.130 Although the District
has never engaged in de jure segregation and, therefore, has never been ordered
to desegregate,131 as had the McFarland Board, it voluntary uses the racial
tiebreaker to ensure diversity or “balance” in the racial composition of its public
high schools.132 The operation of the racial tiebreaker is as follows: If a school’s
student population deviates from the goal of 40% white and 60% minority (+/15%), then the racial tiebreaker is used to grant automatic admission to those
students whose race will enable the school to move closer to the desired racial
125

McFarland, 330 F.Supp.2d at 859.

126

Id.

127

The Court did conclude, however, that with regards to the traditional school assignments in
which African-American and white students are placed on separate assignment tracks, the narrowly
tailored requirement was not met; therefore, the Board’s use of race was constitutionally
impermissible. See id. at 862-864. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s judgment
without issuing a detailed written opinion. See McFarland, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005).
128
See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 377 F.3d 949, 954-955, (9th
Cir. 2004) [hereinafter Parents I], rev’d Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,
426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
129

A school is considered to be “oversubscribed” “when more students want to attend that
school than there are spaces available.” See id. at 955.
130

See id.

131

See id. at 954.

132

See id. at 955.
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composition.133 Conversely, the racial tiebreaker also operates to deny admission
to those students whose race does not further the District’s diversity goals.134
Because the District, a state actor, utilizes student assignment policies that are
based in part on race, such policies are subject to strict scrutiny and, thus, must
employ ‘narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental
interests.’135
In Parents I, the Ninth Circuit found that the racial tiebreaker program
did not pass constitutional scrutiny. While the Court recognized the pursuit of
educational and societal benefits that accompany racially diverse learning
environments as a compelling interest,136 it found that the racial tiebreaker was
not narrowly tailored to further such interest.137 Upon rehearing en banc, the
Ninth Circuit sanctioned the use of the racial tiebreaker and found that the
measure was narrowly tailored to further the District’s compelling interest in
achieving racially and ethnically diverse student bodies.138 Similar to the District
Court in McFarland, the Court also recognized another compelling interest “ameliorating racial isolation or concentration in . . . high schools by ensuring . . .
[student] assignments do not simply replicate . . . segregated housing patterns.”139
Both Courts in Parents I and Parents II agreed that “one compelling
reason for considering race is to achieve the educational benefits of diversity.”140
Both Courts found that the District’s educational goals complied with the
constitutionally permissible diversity rationale as set forth by the Supreme Court
in Grutter.141 In so doing, the Court in Parents I alluded to the prevention of
133

See id. at 955-956.

134

See id. at n.7.

135

Id. at 960 (quoting Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270). Cf, Parents II, 426 F.3d at 1194 (Kozinski, J.,
concurring) (advocating a rational basis standard of review “because the Seattle plan carries none
of the baggage the Supreme Court has found objectionable in cases where it has applied strict
scrutiny and narrow tailoring”).
136

See id. at 964.

137

See id. at 969.

138

See Parents II, 426 F.3d at 1166.

139

Id; see also James E. Ryan, Voluntary Integration: Asking the Right Questions, 67 OHIO ST.
L.J. 327, 334 (2006) (formulating the constitutional issue related to voluntary race-conscious
student assignment plans as “whether [public schools] have a compelling interest in creating or
maintaining a racially integrated student body”).
140
141

Id. at 1173; see also Parents I, 377 F.3d at 964.

See id. at 962 (discussing the Supreme Court’s sanctioning of the diversity rationale in
Grutter); id. at 964 (concluding that “each of the School District’s proffered interests in using its
racial tiebreaker falls comfortably within the diversity rationale as . . . articulated to (and embraced
by) the Court”); see also Parents II, 426 F.3d at 1173 (describing Grutter’s compelling interest as
“the promotion of the specific educational and societal benefits that flow from diversity”).
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racial isolation as a permissible goal,142 while Parents II directly held that
“ameliorating real, identifiable de facto racial segregation” is a separate
compelling interest.143
Although the Supreme Court has never recognized the elimination of de
facto racial segregation as a compelling interest,144 other lower courts have.145 In
advocating for a new compelling interest for using race in an education context,
the Ninth Circuit employs the following reasoning:
The benefits that flow from integration (or desegregation) exist
whether or not a state actor was responsible for the earlier racial
isolation. Brown’s statement that “in the field of public education
... [s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal” retains
its validity today. The District is entitled to seek the benefits of
racial integration and avoid the harms of segregation even in the
absence of a court order deeming it a violator of the U.S.
Constitution.146
The Court also relies on the Supreme Court’s school desegregation jurisprudence
to justify its sanctioning of school districts’ voluntary race-conscious integration
efforts.147
Unlike the three-judge panel in Parents I, the Parents II Court held that
the race-conscious student assignment plan used by the District was narrowly
tailored to achieve its compelling interests. The contrary holdings may be due, in
part, to the differing narrowly tailored tests utilized by the Courts. Parents I
identified and applied the following six narrowly tailoring requirements: (1)
prohibition of racial quotas; (2) flexible, individualized consideration of each
applicant; (3) prohibition of mechanical or conclusive consideration of race; (4)
earnest consideration of race-neutral alternatives; (5) minimization of adverse
impact on non-preferred group members; and (6) time limitation.148 Parents II,
however, identified the following five factors and only applied factors two
through five: “(1) individualized consideration of applicants; (2) the absence of
quotas; (3) serious, good-faith consideration of race-neutral alternatives to the
affirmative action program; (4) that no member of any racial group was unduly
142

See Parents I, 377 F.3d at 963.

143

See Parents II, 426 F.3d at 1178-1179.

144

See, e.g., Freeman, 503 U.S. at 494 (“Racial balance is not to be achieved for its own sake.
It is to be pursued when racial imbalance has been caused by a constitutional violation.”) (emphasis
added).
145

See Parents II, 426 F.3d at 1178 (citing district and appellate court decisions holding that
the creation and maintenance of desegregated schools serve compelling governmental interests).
146

Id. at 1179 (citation omitted).

147

See id.

148

See Parents I, 377 F.3d at 968-969.
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harmed; and (5) that the program had a sunset provision or some other end
point.”149
In finding the individualized consideration factor inapplicable to the
District’s plan, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on the different contexts of higher
education admissions and secondary education assignments.150 The Court argued
that the protections afforded by individualized consideration in a competitive
university admission context are not relevant in a non-competitive student
assignment context.151 The Supreme Court in Grutter and Gratz employed the
requirement “in order to prevent race from being used as a mechanical proxy for
an applicant’s qualifications.”152 As asserted by the Ninth Circuit, the
requirement is unnecessary in the present case because students’ qualifications
are unrelated to their assignment to a particular school.
If students’
qualifications, such as performance on standardized tests, grades, and artistic and
athletic abilities, are not factors in student assignment decisions, then a holistic,
individualized review or consideration of such factors is not necessary.153
The Court also argued that the differences in compelling interests
advanced by universities and elementary and secondary schools warrant the nonapplication of individualized review. While the use of race in both contexts
seeks to obtain the social and educational benefits of diversity, the university
context lacks the second compelling interest that is present in the high school
context, which is preventing the replication of segregated housing patterns in
public education.154 “Because race itself is the relevant consideration when
attempting to ameliorate de facto segregation, the District’s tiebreaker must
necessarily focus on the race of its students.”155 In the Court’s opinion, to require
school districts to focus on attributes other than race, such as leadership potential,
grades, or life experiences, would undermine their ability to achieve and maintain
racially integrated schools.
149

Parents II, 426 F.3d at 1180.

150

See Ryan, supra note 139, at 335-336, 339 (arguing that the narrow tailoring test must be
formulated in light of the context in which race is used).
151

See id. at 1180-1181; see also Ryan, supra note 139, at 335-336, 339-344 (arguing that
given the different context of employing non-merit based, non-competitive race-conscious
assignment plans, public schools should not be required to give individidualized consideration to
each student).
152

Id. at 1181.

153

See id; see also Holmes, supra note 63, at 595-596 (asserting similar arguments regarding
the inapplicability of Grutter’s individualized consideration requirement to “non-merit-based raceconscious student assignment” programs).
154

See Parents II, 426 F.3d at 1183.

155

Id.
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The Court in Parents I did not appear to address the different contexts of
higher and secondary education as they relate to the individualized consideration
requirement. They merely recognized the requirement as a narrow tailored factor
and applied it to the present case. In so doing, the Court found that instead of
considering several different factors to determine student assignment (as
constitutionally mandated in Grutter and Gratz), the racial tiebreaker
“automatically and mechanically admits…[and denies] hundreds of white and
non-white applicants solely because of their race.”156 The Court concluded that
such operation fails the narrow tailored test as set forth in Grutter by establishing
a ‘de jure [policy] of automatic acceptance or rejection based on a[ ] single ‘soft’
variable.’157 As demonstrated by the conflicting holdings in Parents I and
Parents II, the Supreme Court’s formulation of the compelling interests (if any)
and the narrowly tailored requirements to advance such interests will have a
significant impact on its findings regarding the constitutionality of voluntary
race-conscious student assignment plans.
III.
A GLIMPSE INSIDE THE COURT’S CRYSTAL BALL:
THE BLEAK FUTURE FOR RACE-CONSCIOUS STUDENT ASSIGNMENT PLANS
When one considers the importance of the issues raised in Parents
Involved and Meredith and their potential impact on the provision of educational
opportunities to minority students, it is clear that the decisions will significantly
contribute to the jurisprudence concerning public education in this country. In
determining the constitutionality of race-conscious student assignment plans, the
Supreme Court will either sanction or prohibit school districts’ use of race as a
means to create and maintain racially diverse learning environments.
Unfortunately, the Court’s reasoning and holdings in previous cases involving
the use of race in education present difficult and, in all likelihood,
insurmountable challenges to the sanctioning of voluntary race-conscious student
assignment plans as employed in the cases at bar.
In assessing the constitutionality of voluntary race-conscious student
assignment plans, the Supreme Court must first determine whether the plans
serve a compelling interest.158 Although the Court has never provided a precise
156

Parents I, 377 F.3d at 970 (emphasis added).

157

Id.

158

According to the Supreme Court’s holding in Adarand, all government imposed racial
classifications "must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny." See Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). Therefore, the school districts’ raceconscious student assignment plans “are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures
that further compelling governmental interests.” Id. For a contrary view regarding the appropriate
standard of review, see Parents II, 426 F.3d at 1194 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (advocating a
rational basis standard of review “because the Seattle plan carries none of the baggage the Supreme
Court has found objectionable in cases where it has applied strict scrutiny and narrow tailoring”).
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definition of what constitutes a “compelling interest,”159 the term is generally
assumed to refer to those interests that are ‘of the highest order,’ ‘overriding,’ or
‘unusually important.’160 To date, the Supreme Court has recognized two
compelling interests that justify the government’s constitutional use of race: (1)
to remedy past discrimination161 and (2) to achieve student body diversity in
higher education.162 The school districts in Meredith and Parents Involved ask
the Court to recognize a third – to achieve and maintain racially integrated
elementary and secondary schools.163 Considering the Court’s prior discussions
and holdings regarding government’s remedial authority in the context of de
facto segregation and its prohibition against racial balancing, it is unlikely that it
will “expand[ ] the range of permissible uses of race”164 to include the creation
and maintenance of racially diverse public schools. Even if the school districts
succeed in demonstrating a compelling interest, the Court will likely prohibit
their continued use of race under the challenged plans due to their failure to meet
narrowly tailored requirements.
A.

De Jure vs. De Facto Segregation

Directly addressing the constitutionality of the voluntary use of race to
remedy de facto segregation in public education will be a case of first impression
for the Court.165 The Court, however, has had previous opportunities to consider
the use of race to remedy de jure segregation in the educational context.166 In its
desegregation jurisprudence, the Court has permitted school districts to employ
race-conscious measures in their attempts to eliminate unconstitutional dual
159

See Thomas R. Bender, Does the Right to Trial by Jury Place Constitutional Limits on
Prejudgment Interest?, 39 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 935, 950-951 (2006).
160

Id; see also McFarland, 330 F.Supp.2d at 850 (stating that “[w]hether an asserted interest
is truly compelling is revealed only by assessing the objective validity of the goal, its importance to
[the government actor] and the sincerity of [the government actor’s] interest”).
161

See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986).

162

See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325.

163

See Brief in Opposition at 11-13, Meredith, 126 S.Ct. 2351 (No. 05-915), 2006 WL
448513; Brief in Opposition at 16, Parents Involved, 126 S.Ct. 2351 (No. 05-908), 2006 WL
789611.
164

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 357 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

165

See Parents II, 426 F.3d at 1173 (noting that “the Supreme Court has never decided a case
involving the consideration of race in a voluntarily imposed school assignment plan intended to
promote racially and ethnically diverse secondary schools”).
166

(1969).

See, Swann, 402 U.S. 1; United States v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Educ., 365 U.S. 225
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educational systems.167 The measures, however, were restricted to circumstances
in which schools’ student bodies and faculties were racially imbalanced as a
result of the districts’ intentional discrimination. Such circumstances do not exist
in Parents Involved and Meredith.
As previously discussed, the District in Parents Involved has never
experienced legal segregation and, therefore, has never been subject to a
desegregation decree.168 The District’s use of race does not seek to remedy the
effects of intentional discrimination but rather to prevent racial imbalance that
would result from student assignments based on racially segregated housing
patterns. The same is true for the Board’s utilization of race in McFarland.
Although the Board had previously been subject to a desegregation
decree, the decree was dissolved in June 2000, ten months prior to the Board’s
adoption of the race-conscious student assignment plan.169 To justify the
dissolution of the decree, the District Court found that “[t]o the greatest extent
practicable, the Decree has eliminated the vestiges associated with the former
policy of segregation and its pernicious effects.”170 Therefore, arguably, the
Board’s use of racial guidelines is not necessary to eliminate vestiges of racial
discrimination since such effects have been deemed to already have been
eliminated. Instead, the Board utilizes the racial guidelines to maintain the
racially integrated schools created under the desegregation decree.
As noted by the District Court responsible for lifting the decree in
McFarland, student assignment racial guidelines and ratios “were shielded from
normal constitutional scrutiny” if employed under a federally mandated
desegregation order.171 Due to school districts’ blatant disregard for the Supreme
Court’s mandate to desegregate, there existed an urgent need for courts to take an
active role in directing desegregation efforts.172 Within this role, courts issued
various desegregation mandates, and school districts implemented various
policies and programs in their efforts to comply with such mandates. Even
though “voluntary school integration” may be viewed “as an extension of the
167

See id. at 235-236 (sanctioning the establishment of racial ratios for school faculties as a
desegregation measure); see also, Swann, 402 U.S. at 25 (permitting the use of racial mathematical
ratios to ensure student body diversity).
168

See Parents I, 377 F.3d at 954.

169

See McFarland, 330 F.Supp.2d at 841.

170

Hampton v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 102 F.Supp.2d 358, 360 (W.D.Ky. 2000)
[hereinafter Hampton II].
171
Id. at 376; see also Hampton v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 72 F.Supp.2d 753, 777
(W.D.Ky. 1999) [hereinafter Hampton I] (“When the Board acts pursuant to the continuing Decree,
it acts lawfully.”).
172
See Freeman, 503 U.S. at 472 (acknowledging school districts’ delay in complying with
Brown I and Brown II desegregation mandates); Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301 (instructing district
courts to enter desegregation decrees to require schools to desegregate “with all deliberate speed”).
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Supreme Court’s school desegregation jurisprudence,”173 it does not necessarily
follow that policies implemented under the legal protection of a desegregation
decree will survive constitutional scrutiny once the order has been lifted.174
As argued in Parents Involved and Meredith, the context in which state
actors use race and ethnicity is extremely important when determining the
constitutionality of their usage.175 Just as the benefits attained by using race in
elementary and secondary education may differ from those attained from using
race in higher education, the necessity of racial considerations in federally
mandated student assignment plans may differ from the necessity of such
considerations in voluntary plans. In Jenkins, the Supreme Court clarified that its
pronouncement in Brown I “was tied purely to de jure segregation, not de facto
segregation.”176 Because states had intentionally required Blacks to attend
separate, inferior schools, states had an affirmative duty to implement those
measures that would effectively eliminate dual educational systems.177 The
Court found that measures involving racial guidelines and ratios were necessary
to remedy the harms caused by de jure segregation.178 Once states had
practically eliminated the harms associated with de jure segregation, the Court
held that desegregation duties had been fulfilled since “mere de facto segregation
(unaccompanied by discriminatory inequalities in educational resources) does not
constitute a continuing harm after the end of de jure segregation.179 In Freeman,
the Court further clarified that with regards to its jurisprudence concerning the
imposition of “‘awkward,’ ‘inconvenient, and ‘even bizarre’ measures to achieve
racial balance in student assignment,” such measures were reserved to the context

173

McFarland, 330 F.Supp.2d at 851; see also Parents II, 426 F.3d at 1179 (concluding that
the Supreme Court’s reference to “the voluntary integration of schools as sound educational policy
within the discretion of local school officials” supports the Court’s finding that “[t]he District is
entitled to seek the benefits of racial integration and avoid the harms of segregation even in the
absence of a court order deeming it a violator of the U.S. Constitution”) (emphasis in original).
174
See, e.g., Hampton II, 102 F.Supp.2d at 381 (holding that the Board’s race-conscious
magnet school student assignment plan that had previously been permissible under the
desegregation decree was not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest).
175
See Parents II, 426 F.3d at 1173 (stating that ‘[c]ontext matters when reviewing race-based
governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause’) (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326);
McFarland, 330 F.Supp.2d at 849-850 (reasoning that “[t]he different context ‘matters’ because,
under the Equal Protection Clause, ‘[n]ot every decision influenced by race is equally
objectionable…’”) (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327).
176

Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 120 (emphasis added).

177

See Green, 391 U.S. at 437-438.

178

See supra note 162.

179

Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 122.
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of de jure segregation, not phases “when the imbalance is attributable…to
independent demographic forces.”180
The current Supreme Court may rely on this rationale to find that the
elimination of racial isolation attributable to de facto segregation in public
schools does not justify the use of racial guidelines and tiebreakers in voluntary
student assignment plans. In its reluctance to expand the justifications for the
voluntary use of racial classifications, the Court may confine such race-based
measures to the context of de jure segregation, which, as previously discussed, is
inapplicable in the present cases.181
B.

Racial Balancing

Despite the various contexts in which race and ethnicity have been
employed to achieve governmental interests, the Supreme Court has routinely
rejected voluntary racial balancing as a permissible interest to justify their
usage.182 In rejecting racial balancing “for its own sake,” the Court in Freeman
limited its pursuit to those circumstances in which “racial imbalance has been
caused by a constitutional violation.”183 Considering the arguments advanced by
the petitioners in Parents Involved and Meredith,184 it is apparent that both school
districts will have to overcome the Court’s prohibition against racial balancing to
sustain their utilization of race-conscious student assignment plans.
In Grutter, the Supreme Court attempted to distinguish between racial
balancing and the pursuit of a “critical mass” of minority students. According to
the court, a school’s attempt ‘to assure within [a] student body some specified
percentage of a particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin’

180

See Freeman, 503 U.S. at 493

181

See Parents II, 426 F.3d at 1208, n.17 (Bea, J., dissenting) (noting that the Supreme
Court’s desegregation jurisprudence sanctions the use of race to “to combat past de jure
segregation” not “to achieve racial balance absent de jure segregation”).
182
See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329-330 (holding that “outright racial balancing…is patently
unconstitutional”); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306-307 (rejecting racial balancing as facially invalid).
183
184

Freeman, 503 U.S. at 494.

For example, one of the questions presented by the petitioner in Parents Involved asks the
following:
May a school district that is not racially segregated and that normally permits a
student to attend any high school of her choosing deny a child admission to her
chosen school solely because of her race in an effort to achieve a desired racial
balance in particular schools, or does such racial balancing violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Parents Involved, 126 S.Ct. 2351 (No. 05-908), 2006 WL
1579631 (emphasis added); see also Brief of Petitioner at 5-6, Meredith, 126 S.Ct. 2351 (No. 05915), 2006 WL 2433475 (arguing that the Board’s imposition of racial guidelines “is simply an
action for the sake of reflecting racial distribution”).
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amounts to unconstitutional racial balancing.185 If, however, a school defines its
diversity pursuits “by reference to the educational benefits that diversity is
designed to produce,” then such pursuits may be constitutionally permissible.186
The respondents in Parents Involved and Meredith argue that their raceconscious plans have met this test.
The respondents in Parents Involved argue that the District’s plan,
including the integration tiebreaker, does not amount to racial balancing because
it does “not seek to achieve a pre-determined racial distribution in any school,” as
proscribed by the Constitution.187 Rather, the plan seeks to afford white and
minority students the opportunity to attend popular schools that may not be close
to their neighborhoods.188 Similarly, the respondents in Meredith also argue that
their use of racial guidelines in student assignments is not motivated by
constitutionally impermissible interests.189 Rather, the guidelines are used to
promote the Board’s good faith interest in maintaining racial integration in its
schools and the educational benefits that flow from such environments.190 The
District Court agreed with this argument and relied on the fact that the Board had
“precisely described the academic, social and institutional benefits it achieves
from integrated schools” to demonstrate that it had not implemented the racial
guidelines to achieve racial balancing “merely for its own sake.”191 This
argument, however, fails to adequately address the potentially defeating
counterargument that the 15%-50% racial guidelines are mechanical mandates
intended to assure a specified percentage of African-American students in each
school.192 Such racial mandates, which could be termed “quotas,” are absolutely
proscribed by the Constitution.193
185

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329-330.

186

Id. at 330. The Majority’s proffered distinction drew much disagreement from other
Justices. See, e.g. id. at 355 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (questioning how
the Law Schools’ interest in educational benefits is not racial balancing considering the Law
School’s apparent belief “that only a racially mixed student body can lead to the educational
benefits it seeks”); id. at 379, 383 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that “[s]tripped of its
‘critical mass’ veil, the Law School's program is revealed as a naked effort to achieve racial
balancing” due to its precise attention to numbers when making admissions decisions).
187

Brief in Opposition at 17, Parents Involved, 126 S.Ct. 2351 (No. 05-908), 2006 WL

789611.
188

Id.

189

See Brief in Opposition at 14, Meredith, 126 S.Ct. 2351 (No. 05-915), 2006 WL 448513.

190

See id.
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McFarland, 330 F.Supp.2d at 855.
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See supra notes 121-122 and accompanying text.
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See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315.
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As defined by the Supreme Court:
Quotas 'impose a fixed number or percentage which must be
attained, or which cannot be exceeded,' and ‘insulate the
individual from comparison with all other candidates for the
available seats.’ In contrast, ‘a permissible goal ... require[s] only
a good-faith effort ... to come within a range demarcated by the
goal itself,’ and permits consideration of race as a ‘plus’ factor in
any given case while still ensuring that each candidate
‘compete[s] with all other qualified applicants.’194
The attainment of a student body that is composed of no fewer than 15% and no
more than 50% African-American students is not a “goal” that the Board strives
to achieve. Rather, it is a fixed percentage with which schools are required to
seek compliance.195 The respondents, in fact, state that “[t]he Plan provides that
each school (except preschools, kindergartens, alternative and special schools,
and the four exempted magnet schools) shall have not less than 15% and not
more than 50% black students.”196 Including such directive does not appear to
comport with the Supreme Court’s sanctioning of the use of race-conscious
measures in public education.
Considering that both student assignment plans seek to create and
maintain racially balanced schools, both are vulnerable to the Court’s
proscription of unconstitutional racial balancing. Now that Justice O’Connor, the
drafter of the Grutter majority, is no longer on the bench, it is not apparent that
the current members of the Court will accept the racially balancing test as
articulated by the majority in Grutter. Rather, the Court may employ a more
exacting standard to ensure that the interests motivating the utilization of
voluntary race-conscious plans are constitutionally permissible.
C.

Individualized Consideration

A final impediment to the constitutionality of the race-conscious plans is
their failure to meet narrowly tailoring requirements. As required by the standard
of review set forth in Grutter, all admissions plans that use racial classifications
must be narrowly tailored to further compelling interests.197 Constitutional raceconscious admissions plans are ‘flexible enough to consider all pertinent
elements of diversity’ and “ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an
individual and not in a way that makes race or ethnicity the defining feature of
194

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335 (citations omitted).

195

See supra note 122.

196

Brief in Opposition at 3-4, Meredith, 126 S.Ct. 2351 (No. 05-915), 2006 WL 448513
(emphasis added).
197

See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 308.
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the application.” 198 Unfortunately, the race-conscious student assignment plans
utilized in Parents Involved and Meredith fail both criteria.
Although the Ninth Circuit held that the non-competitive context of
elementary and secondary education does not require individualized review,199 it
is doubtful that the Supreme Court will adopt a similar view. While it is true that
“context matters when reviewing” race-based measures;200 the context of
elementary and secondary elementary does not warrant the inapplicability of
individualized consideration. Rather, it is, perhaps, the most pertinent context
that necessitates individualized review.
All racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny to guard against the
infringement of personal rights guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution.201 Strict scrutiny is necessary to protect individuals from the
potential stigmatic harms imposed by group-based racial classifications.202 More
so than in other contexts, such protections must be afforded to children in
elementary and secondary education. There is, perhaps, no other more necessary
context for such protections than elementary and secondary education. The
potential harms that can result from telling a child that he or she cannot attend a
particular school because he or she is of the wrong race are immeasurable.
“Harms such as promotion of racial inferiority, strengthening of racial
stereotypes, [and] heightening of racial hostility”203 are precisely those harms that
the Court’s desegregation cases attempted to remedy.204 It is, therefore, highly
improbable that the current Supreme Court would permit the use of racial
classifications in elementary and secondary education without requiring that they
meet every element of strict scrutiny.
Contrary to the narrowly tailored criteria set forth in Grutter, the student
assignment plans in question do not afford meaningful consideration to diversity
elements other than race and ethnicity. The District Court in McFarland argues
that the Board’s plan is constitutional because it considers other diversity factors
“such as place of residence and student choice of school or program.”205 Such
argument cannot sustain the constitutionality of the plan because the operation of
198

Id. at 309 (citation omitted).

199

See Parents II, 426 F.3d at 1183.

200

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 308.

201

See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.

202

See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).

203

Nelson, supra note 26, at 38.

204

See, e.g., Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494 (noting that legally sanctioned racial segregation
produces feelings of inferiority, which detrimentally “affects the motivation of a child to learn”).
205

McFarland, 330 F.Supp.2d at 859.
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the plan is such that these factors are effectively irrelevant if a student attempts to
enroll in a school where the racial composition will fall outside the racial
guidelines if he or she is admitted. Despite the student’s other “diversity
factors,” he or she will most likely be denied admission.206 The racial tiebreaker
employed in Parents Involved operates in a similar manner in that depending on
the racial makeup of a particular school to which a student is applying for
admission, his or her race can be the determinative factor in deciding whether he
or she is admitted or denied.207 In both plans, race operates as the defining and
decisive feature of a student’s application not as a constitutionally permissible
“plus” factor.208 Therefore, the plans are not narrowly tailored and, thus, cannot
pass constitutional scrutiny.
CONCLUSION: FULFILLING BROWN’S MANDATE
In assessing the constitutionality of voluntary race-conscious student
assignment plans in the context of de facto racial isolation in elementary and
secondary schools, the Supreme Court will be guided by its previous holdings
and rationales. As it attempts to balance the proffered interests in creating and
maintaining racial integration against the constitutional protections provided by
the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, the Court will be guided by the
principle that “[t]he Constitution does not prevent individuals from choosing to
live together, to work together, or to send their children to school together, so
long as the State does not interfere with their choices on the basis of race.”209
Once the inquiry has been completed, the challenged plans will most likely be
invalidated. In light of this probable outcome, local, state and federal officials
should immediately engage in the development of race-neutral programs and
policies that can effectively address the harmful effects of resegregation of public
schools.

206

As noted by the District Court:
[W]here the racial composition of an entire school lies near either end of the
racial guidelines, the application of any student for open enrollment, transfer or
even to a magnet program could be affected. In a specific case, a student's race,
whether Black or White, could determine whether that student receives his or
her first, second, third or fourth choice of school.
See id. at 842.
207

See Parents I, 377 F.3d at 955-956 (explaining that the racial tiebreaker operates to grant
automatic admission to students who are of the preferred race needed to help schools attain the
desired racial ratio of white and minority students).
208
See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271-272 (invalidating a race-conscious admissions policy because of
its use of race as the decisive factor in an admissions decision rather than as a “plus” factor along
with many different diversity criteria).
209

Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 121 (emphasis added).
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School officials should not retard the progress that has been made in the
provision of educational opportunities to minority students by paving “a one-way
street” to racially and economically segregated neighborhood schools.210 As
previously discussed, students attending such schools face challenges, which are
often insurmountable, that range from less qualified teachers211 to a culture of
lower academic expectations.212 To combat these challenges, schools should
employ race-neutral213 student assignment plans and implement educational
policies that effectively address deficiencies in the provision of equal educational
opportunities to minority students.
Some schools have already begun to experiment with race-neutral
measures in their efforts to achieve racially diverse student bodies.214 Such
measures include the consideration of ‘diversity in student achievement’ and
‘diversity in socioeconomic status.’215
Limiting concentrations of lowperforming students in schools will impact student body diversity since minority
students often perform lower than their white counterparts on academic
measures.216
Similarly, assigning students to schools based on their
socioeconomic status can also achieve racial diversity because of the existing

210

Hampton II, 102 F.Supp.2d at 379.

211

See supra notes 67-68, 89-95 and accompanying text.

212

See supra note 96 and accompanying text.

213

In the context of student assignments, “race-neutral” refers to those plans that do not
classify students based on their race or ethnicity. Such plans are not “race-blind” in that they
ignore the effects of race on educational opportunities. They simply do not consider a student’s
race when assigning him or her to a particular school. See Nelson, supra note 26, at 7-11
(discussing the meaning of “race-neutral” alternatives in the context of higher education admissions
decisions).
214

See, e.g., Boger, supra note 78, at 1397-1400 (discussing the implementation of raceneutral student assignment plans in Wake County, North Carolina).
215
216

Id. at 1397.

For example, in 2004, black and Hispanic children age 9, 13 and 17 had lower average
reading scale scores than white students. See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF
EDUCATION
STATISTICS
2005
TBL.
108,
available
at
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d05/tables/dt05_108.asp.
The same was true for their
118,
available
at
performance
in
mathematics.
See
id,
at
TBL.
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d05/tables/dt05_118.asp. In 2001, the average geography and
U.S. history scores for white students were higher than those achieved by black and Hispanic
116,
available
at
students.
See
id.,
at
TBL.
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d05/tables/dt05_116.asp.
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racial gaps in socioeconomic status.217 Such “class-based” assignment plans are
also beneficial because they provide the added benefit of socioeconomic
diversity, which may, in fact, be more educationally beneficial than racial
diversity.
Some scholars have concluded that ‘[n]o other single social measure is
consistently more strongly related than poverty to school achievement.’218
Consequently, “overall socioeconomic composition of schools seem[ ] more
predictive of academic achievement than [does] a student's individual
socioeconomic status.”219 If this is true, school officials should direct their
attention to achieving and maintaining socioeconomic diversity rather than racial
diversity. Presumably, such efforts would not be subject to the heightened and,
potentially, fatal standard of strict scrutiny because they neither employ racial
classifications nor seek to achieve racial diversity benefits.220 Rather, they seek
to achieve the educational benefits of socioeconomic integration.
In their attempts to provide equal educational opportunities to all
students, school officials should implement policies to remedy the disparities that
currently exist between minority, economically disadvantaged schools and their
non-minority economically advantaged counterparts. As often noted by many
scholars, “[t]o those who need the best our education system has to offer, we give
the least. The least well-trained teachers. The lowest-level curriculum. The oldest
books. The least instructional time. Our lowest expectations. Less, indeed, of
everything that we believe makes a difference.”221 As previously discussed, one
glaring disparity is the level of teacher quality.222 Students attending high
minority, low socioeconomic schools are disproportionately subjected to being
217

See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2006 TBL. 6-1,
available at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/2006/section1/table.asp?tableID=440 (indicating that
70% of black 4th-graders and 73% of Hispanic 4th-graders are eligible for free or reduced lunch, as
compared to only 24% of white 4th-graders); see also Dickerson, supra note 94, at 1756-1758
(noting significant racial disparities in wealth as shown by levels of home ownership, personal
assets and business ownership).
218

Boger, supra note 78, at 1416.

219

Id; see also supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text; Orfield, supra note 83, at 280
(concluding that peer socioeconomic status accounts for more than 75% of the difference between
minority and white students’ academic achievement).
220

See id. at 1398-1399 (concluding that race-neutral student assignment plans should not be
subject to strict scrutiny as long as they have not “been adopted as a mere pretext for continuing
racial assignments”); see also Levit, supra note 38, at 511 (encouraging schools to “first try
experiments that are more likely to be successful and less likely to be unconstitutional” in their
efforts to achieve educational goals).
221
See Susan P. Leviton & Matthew H. Joseph, An Adequate Education for All Maryland’s
Children: Morally Right, Economically Necessary, and Constitutionally Required, 52 MD. L. REV.
1137, 1142 (1993).
222

See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
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taught by lesser qualified teachers.223 Such inequitable learning environments
negatively affects not only the quality of education that students receive224 but
also their psychological well-being by sending and reinforcing messages ‘that
society doesn’t care enough about whether they learn.’225
To combat such debilitating effects, school officials should invest in the
quality of their teachers, especially those teaching in lower-performing schools,
by implementing initiatives that are designed to improve teacher qualifications
and effectiveness, such as pre-service teacher education, mentoring programs and
continual professional development.226 School officials should also provide
incentives to encourage more qualified teachers to teach at lower-performing
schools. Such incentives could be immediate such as salary increases, or they
could be long-term such as early retirement opportunities. More qualified
teachers may be enticed to teach at high minority, low socioeconomic schools if
doing so afforded them the opportunity to be eligible for retirement five or ten
years earlier than their counterparts teaching at more affluent schools. Coupled
with intensive recruitment efforts at the high school and college levels, schools
implementing such beneficial policies could see a significant improvement in the
quality of their teachers and, consequently, the academic quality of their
students.227
Implementing race-neutral assignment policies and teacher quality
initiatives is merely the beginning in addressing the significant costs imposed by
segregated learning environments. To fulfill Brown’s mandate of educational
equality, economically disadvantaged minority students must have the
opportunity to interact with peers from diverse backgrounds to broaden and
heighten their educational goals and possibilities.228 Whether or not the Supreme
Court allows schools to facilitate this interaction through the use of raceconscious student assignment plans, our schools and our country have the moral
responsibility to ensure that such interaction takes place and that it occurs within
223

See id; see also Linda Darling-Hammond, Teacher Quality and Student Achievement: A
Review of State Policy Evidence, 8 EDUC. POL’Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES 1 (2000), available at
http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v8n1/ (reporting findings that poor minority students are taught by less
qualified teachers than their non-minority socially advantaged peers).
224
See id. (concluding that student outcomes and student achievement are negatively affected
by poor teacher quality).
225
See Jeannie Oakes, Education Inadequacy, Inequality, and Failed State Policy: A Synthesis
of Expert Reports Prepared for Williams v. State of California 1, 9-10 available at
http://www.decentschools.org/expert_reports/oakes_report.pdf.
226

See Darling-Hammond, supra note 223.

227

See id. (describing significant student achievement gains made in North Carolina and
Connecticut following the states’ enactment of substantial reforms targeting teacher quality).
228

See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
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educational institutions that provide all students access to equal resources
necessary to create and fulfill their academic dreams.

